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NOTES AND COMMENT
compensation therefor. Later while in the employ of another, a
slip as he was holding a heavy weight resulted in a fracture of the
breast bone. The prior accident was held to have had no relation
to the present one, which was caused by slipping. Here there were
two accidents. Each was separate and unconnected with the other.
The slip could, and did, of itself cause such an accident while one
was holding a heavy weight.
From the foregoing it is deduced that: (A) if a casual rela-
tionship exists between the first and second accidents, the first em-
ployer is liable. (B) If the second accident is separate and inde-
pendent of the first then the second employer is liable. (C) When
there are two distinct accidents, but the subsequent one is aggra-
vated by the original one, then both employers become equally liable
and the compensation will be apportioned between them. These
rules are just and equitable. They have arisen to satisfy the re-
quirements of that great piece of paternal legislation, the Workmen's
Compensation Law, which seeks to alleviate and soften our "harsh
common law rules giving the master such defenses as the fellow
servant rule and others furnishing just ground for the charge of
class selfishness." 4 The liability for compensation is placed upon
the employer under whom the accident occurs. This is the motivat-
ing purpose behind the Act. The above rules give power and
expression to the motive.
HARRY B. SAMES.
CRIMINAL INTENT GENERALLY AND AS APPLIED TO CRIMES M1ALA
IN SE AND CRIMES MALA PROHIBITA.
Criminal intent and criminal acts, as well as the laws governing
attempts to commit crimes, have been discussed and analyzed in
numerous treatises and periodicals by contemporary legal writers.
And yet it would seem that that most elusive term "criminal intent"
is still beyond explanation.
We say in discussing a case such as State v. White 2 where the
defendant was found guilty of beating a drum within the compact
part of the town, contrary to the provisions of the statute, that the
criminal intention is to be inferred from the criminal act. On the
other hand, we say that in larceny the prosecution must establish both
the criminal intent and the criminal act to prove its case.3 At the
'EDGAR, LAW OF TORTS (1st ed. 1927) §58 at p. 41.
'CLARK, CRimINAL LAW (3d ed. 1915); Walter Wheeler Cook, Act, In-
tention, and Motive in the Criminal Law (1917) 26 YALE L. .. 645; Beale,
Criininal Attempts (1903) 16 HARv. L. REv. 491.
268 N. H. 48, 5 Atl. 828 (1891).
'People v. Jackson, 8 Barb. 637 (N. Y. 1850).
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same time, in larceny cases where a defendant is arrested for pick-
pocketing, the district attorney establishes the people's case by show-
ing that the defendant put his hand into the pocket of the prosecuting
witness and removed an article therefrom. 4  If explanation is asked
we say the intent can be inferred from the act. Quaere, why then
must the State prove criminal intent, as well as the criminal act, in
cases "nala in se, while in cases mala prohibita proof of the forbidden
act itself is deemed sufficient?
Again, most states have a provision similar in tenor to the last
of section 2 of the Penal Law of New York,5 "An act done with
intent to commit a crime, and tending but failing to effect its commis-
sion is an attempt to commit that crime." The statute is generic; it
refers to all crimes. Can there be an attempt to commit such a crime
as was prohibited in the case of State v. White? 6 We say ignorance
of the law does not excuse the commission of crime. Mistake of
fact, however, if found by the jury, establishes the defendant's inno-
cence. Would mistake excuse the defendant if he sold oleomargarine
without giving notice of such as in Welch v. State? 7
By what means is the presence of this essential element "criminal
intent" determined? Obviously we must resort to such external acts
as experience has taught are a manifestation of the internal condition.8
But, if our conclusions would be accurate, we ought to take cogniz-
ance of "those limitations in the capacity of choosing rightly which
arise from abnormal instincts, want of education, lack of intelligence,
and other defects which are most marked in the criminal classes." 9
Within well-known broad exceptions, the law considers none of these.
Practically it cannot, because it is administered through judges and
juries, human instrumentalities, who cannot look into the hearts of
men. We are confined to the "visible physical' manifestations" as
indicia of the "accomplishment determined upon." 10
Men are judged by their acts, and to determine the presence of
criminal intent in certain of these acts the law relies upon the "reason-
able man" theory applying the same test as that used to fix civil
liability in tort. What the reasonable man would have intended by
those same acts, is deemed to be the intent of the accused. If the
accused pleads ignorance, he is informed that every man is deemed to
'People v. Moran, 123 N. Y. 254, 25 N. E. 412 (1890).
'. Y. PENAL LAW, Laws of 1909, c. 88, §2.
'Supra note 2.
145 Wis. 86, 129 N. W. 656 (1911).
'People v. Conroy, 97 N. Y. 62 (1884).
'HOLMES, THE COmmoN LAW (1881) p. 45.
" "The intent formed is the secret and silent operation of the mind, and its
only visible, physical manifestation is in the accomplishment determined upon.
The individual whose intent is sought to be ascertained may remain silent, or
if he speaks may, and probably will, if he has a crime to conceal, speak untruly,
and thus the mind is compelled from necessity to revert to the actual physical
manifestations of the intent exhibited by the result produced as the safest, if
not the only, proof of the fact to be ascertained." Ruger, Ch. J., supra
note 8, at 77.
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know the law. Ignorance is no excuse, and although intent is absent
liability may be imposed."
Certain substantive rules of law cannot otherwise be well ex-
plained. Men are presumed to intend the natural consequences of
their acts. Ignorance of the law and, in some cases, mistake of fact
do not excuse the criminal act. Justification of such harsh rules is
found in the policy of sacrificing the welfare of the individual to
that of society as a whole. If the criminal could shield himself be-
hind ignorance he would be encouraged rather than deterred. But
the law requires him to conform to the norm of conduct recognized
by the community as moral. If he is punished for acts not actually
blameworthy in him, the fault is his, not that of the law.12
Advancing to a consideration of crimes mak in se: An act nalum
in se is a wrong in itself; an act involving illegality from the very
nature of the transaction, upon principles of natural, moral and public
law.13 In prosecuting an accused for such an act, it is said that the
mnens rea must be established as an independent fact. But as pointed
out above, the finding of intent will be no more than a conclusion by
the jury that a reasonable man, acting under the same circumstances,
would have intended to commit that crime.
Thus, where one stabs another in the heart with a knife it will
be presumed that he intended to take life.14 Where the instrument
used is such a one as might reasonably be presumed to cause death,
the killing is murder even if committed in a sudden affray; 1 and
where the person inflicting the wounds on deceased, from which he
died, used such means as were likely to produce death, the killing was
murder.10 It was correct to charge the jury that if the evidence
shows that the defendant used a weapon likely to produce death and
used such weapon in an unlawful, improper, and cruel manner upon
the deceased, and had committed such an act as in its consequences
naturally tended to destroy the life of the child and from which the
child died, although he may not have intended to kill hm yet it would
be murder.17 (Italics ours.)
Again in those cases where one is charged with causing the death
of another "by an act imminently dangerous to others, and evincing a
depraved mind, regardless of human life, although without a pre-
meditated design to effect the death of an individual," 1s intent is not
1 HOLM ES, THE CoMMON LAW, p. 50.
Ibid. at 47, 48.
"STORY, AGENCY §346.
' Thomas v. People, 67 N. Y. 218 (1876).
People v. Tuhi, 2 Wheeler Cr. Cas. 242 (N. Y. 1820).
People v. Cunningham, 6 Parker Cr. Rep. 398 (N. Y. 1786).
'William v. State, 57 Ga. 478 (1876) ; LewNis v. State, 72 Ga. 164. 53 Am
Rep. 835 (1883); see U. S. v. Freeman, 4 Mason 505 (U. S. 1827); Mayer v.
People, 106 Ill. 306, 46 Am. Rep. 698 (1893); Wellar v. People, 30 Mich. 16(1878).
" Supra note 5, §104, subdv. 2.
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an element of the crime.19 Guilt will be determined from the degree
of danger attending the acts.2 0
However, in the law of attempts intent plays an important role.
Here the statute defines as criminal those acts which tend toward but
fall short of completing a crime. Certainly such acts standing alone
can do no harm, for by the statutory definition itself, they tend but
fail to effect the commission of a crime. Once the mens rea is pres-
ent the entire picture is changed, then the situation is the same as in
the principal crime, except that some unforeseen circumstance has
prevented the consummation of the final act; and the analysis which
was made of criminal intent in crimes mala in se applies here. Never-
theless, the decisions are not in harmony; courts have been unable to
give us a rule by which we may know where preparation ends and
attempt begins. Nor have they reconciled such decisions as People
v. Jaffee, ' wherein it was held that defendant could not be convicted
of an attempt to receive stolen goods where he purchased twenty
yards of cloth which he believed stolen, but which, in fact, were not,
with People v. Moran,22 in which case the defendant was convicted
of an attempt to commit grand larceny because he attempted to steal
from the person of a woman and no evidence was introduced to show
that the woman had anything in her pocket; or with such cases as
Mullen v. State 23 in which the defendant, because he aimed a gun at
another and pulled the trigger was convicted of an attempt to commit
murder although the cartridge had no cap on it and could not have
been discharged; 24 or with Lewis v. State,25 where a slave, who ran
after a white girl but desisted before he caught her, was convicted of
an attempt to commit rape. No doubt the apprehensions of a com-
munity and its abhorrence of certain crimes will influence juries as
in the last case supra, but the law should be above prejudice and
passion.
When we come to a consideration of statutory crimes or those
denoted "'nala prohibita" we encounter greater difficulty in harmon-
izing the decisions with the general rule. In the texts and opinions
of judges it is frequently said that intent is inferred. If this is true
then intent is equally an element of statutory crimes, because; whether
inferred or found, it must be present, the only distinction being the
manner in which its presence is determined.
It is submitted that the inference of intent in crimes mala pro-
hibita is a mere legal fiction used by courts to arrive at a result at a
"People v. Sheehan, 49 Barb. 217 (N. Y. 1867) ; People v. Darragh, 141
App. Div. 408, 126 N. Y. Supp. 522 (lst Dept. 1910), af'd, 203 N. Y. 527,
96 N. E. 1124 (1911).
HOLMES, op. cit. supra note 9, p. 60.
= 185 N. Y. 497, 78 N. E. 169 (1906).
'Supra note 4.
'45 Ala. 43, 6 Am. Rep. 691 (1871).
-" It was just as impossible for Mullen to murder another as it was for
Jaffe to purchase stolen goods.
'35 Ala. 380 (1860).
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time when it was thought that there could be no crime without the
criminal intention and such fiction has been retained to this day.
There is an abundance of evidence in support of the statement that
intent is not an element of statutory crimes by the weight of author-
ity, mistake of fact is not a valid defense in such cases.2 6 A religious
belief in plural marriages is not a defense to a charge of polygamy,2T
nor that defendant believed the prosecutrx had attained the age of
consent, when charged with the crime of rape in the second degree,
28
nor that one accused of bigamy believed his former wife was dead
when in fact she was living at the time he contracted the second
marriage.
29
In the case of Commonwealth v. Mixer,3" wherein the defendant
was accused of illegally transporting intoxicating liquor into the city
of Lynn, Rugg, J. made the following comment: "In the prosecution
of crimes under the common law, apart from statutes, ordinarily it is
necessary to allege and prove a guilty intent, and, as a general prin-
ciple, a crime is not committed if the mind of the person doing the
act is innocent. An evil intention and an unlawful action must concur
in order to constitute a crime. But there are many instances in recent
times where the legislature in the exercise of the police power has
prohibited under penalty the performance of a specific act. The
doing of the inhibited act constitutes the crime, and the moral turpi-
tude or purity of the motive by which it was promoted and knowledge
or ignorance of its criminal character are immaterial circumstances on
the question of guilt. The only fact to be determined in these cases
is whether the defendant did the act. In the interest of the public
the burden is placed upon the actor of ascertaining at his peril
whether the deed is within the prohibition of any criminal statute."
And other judges have written to the same effect.
Perhaps the rule as above stated is burdensome in individual
cases, but it does not work a greater hardship than requiring all to
measure up to a given standard, as in crimes mala in se. No state has
yet attained the ideal society where "men do unto others as they
would be done by." It is, therefore, necessary to formulate rules of
conduct forbidding certain acts, not necessarily criminal in themselves,
but which tend toward discord, unfair advantage, and the destruction
of life and property. Stringent traffic laws, anti-trust laws, and the
like, compelling strict conformity, and the punishment for their
Commonwealth v. Mixer, 207 Mass. 141, 93 N. E. 249 (1910) and cases
cited therein; see also Reynolds v. U. S., 98 U. S. 145, 25 L. ed. 244 (1878);
Dotson v. State, 62 Ala. 141, 34 Atn. Rep. 2 (1878).
- Reynolds v. U. S., supra note 26.
People v. Marks, 146 App. Div. 11, 130 N. Y. Supp. 524 (1st Dept.
1911).
2'Dotson v. State, mtpra note 26.
1 Commonvealth v. Mixer, supra note 26, at 142, 93 N. E. at 249.
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infraction, may vary according to the frequency of the recurrence of
such inimical acts. Such laws are necessary in the endeavor to
maintain a harmonious society, and in cases involving the presence
of criminal intent dicta to the effect that such is inferred misleads, is
confusing, and unnecessary to a finding of guilt. The forbidden
acts alone suffice.81
In conclusion: We have attempted to show that the statements
"there can be no crime without the criminal intention," and "the
intent is inferred from the act" are not applicable to all crimes. We
must first turn to the statute. If such words as "intent" or "know-
ingly" are there, then the above statements are relevant and mistake
or intoxication may be a defense because they show an absence of the
intent. On the other hand, if the statute does not require knowledge
or intent, such statements as "there can be no crime without the
criminal intent" and "the intent is inferred from the act" are irrele-
vant. They can serve only to confuse the jury whose task, in these
cases, is merely to determine from the evidence whether the defendant
did those acts required by the statute. The intent with which they
are done does not lessen or aggravate the crime.
LEO G. HOSENFELD.
'In the light of the Penal Law, the distinction between crimes nala in sc,
and mala prohibita, seems obsolete. See NoTE (1930) 30 COL. L. REv. 74.
